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The granting of amnesties has now become a cornerstone of peacebuilding efforts in 
societies emerging from conflict. Yet, the impact of the role of religion and ethnicity 
in determining attitudes towards such arrangements has not been empirically assessed. 
Mindful of this omission, this article investigates the relationship between a range of 
religious measures – religious practices and beliefs in and about God – and 
ethnonationalist identity on public attitudes toward amnesty in Northern Ireland. 
Based on nationally representative survey data, the results suggest that although 
Protestants are significantly more opposed to such an initiative than Catholics, both 
religious beliefs and ethnonational identity are significant, albeit divergent, net 
predictors with respect to their differing views. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The post-cold war era has witnessed a proliferation of intrastate conflicts based on 
ethnic differences. Intrastate conflicts, or civil wars, have now replaced interstate 
conflicts, or international wars, as the most prevalent forms of violence.1 Currently, 
around 95 per cent of wars are civil wars, the large majority of which are considered 
ethnic conflicts, although what exactly constitutes an ethnic conflict is open to much 
dispute.2 Moreover, as Collier et al point out,3 once they break out, civil wars are 
difficult to stop: about half of the countries emerging from civil war slip back into 
violence within five years, and this pattern is particularly marked when the 
antagonists are mobilized along ethnic lines.4  It is important to note, however, ethnic 
conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, ethnic wars have been a 
common form of armed conflicts around the world. Even today, within-country 
conflicts based on ethnic divisions are considered one of the most pervasive and 
deadly forms of war. While there is evidence to suggest that the number of such 
conflicts have declined considerably in recent years – most notably since their earlier 
peak in the mid-1990s5 – ethnic conflict is still considered one of the greatest threats 
to international security in the world today.6   
While much has been written on the nature, extent and causes of ethnic 
conflict, its relationship to religion remains relatively unexplored. As a number of 
scholars have noted, classic studies of ethnicity, ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict 
have paid little attention to religion, viewing it as either irrelevant or marginal at best.7 
Pointing instead to the role of a range of economic and/or political influences – such 
as ethnic grievances and fractionalisation, greed, relative deprivation and repression, 
the political organisations of minority groups and their desire for self-determination – 
traditional studies of ethnic conflict suggest that it is these factors, and not religion, 
which are the primary, if not sole, determinants of ethnic rebellion and conflict.8  Yet, 
the absence of such attention as to the role of religion must be considered surprising 
for the following reasons.  
First, not only do many ethnic conflicts have a strong religious dimension but 
religion and ethnicity as a source of identity are often deeply intertwined. In fact, not 
only is religion often included in definitions of ethnicity but most conflict analysts 
treat religion as a subset of ethnicity.9 Second, contrary to the views of secularisation 
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theorists that religion would either wither away or retreat to the private sphere as a 
result of modernisation,10 there is evidence to suggest that not only have religious 
conflicts significantly increased more than nonreligious conflicts, particularly since 
the 1980s, but conflicts involving religious factors are more intense and intractable in 
nature.11  In fact, some scholars argue that not only has modernity and its 
accompanying insecurity led to the revival of religion but that religiously motivated 
violence has now become an ubiquitous element of modern conflicts and the 
dominant form of terrorism in the world today.12  
While more recent research has focused on the relationship between religion 
and ethnic conflict, the relationship between religion, ethnicity and transitional justice 
mechanisms has remained largely unexplored. This is particularly the case when we 
consider the influence of ethnonationalism and religious conviction on attitudes 
towards amnesty. The absence of such research may be considered surprising for 
many reasons. First, amnesties have become a central feature of transitional justice 
efforts in societies emerging from conflict. In fact, the granting of amnesties has now 
moved centre stage as the most frequently used transitional justice mechanism for 
societies emerging from conflict.13 Secondly, in addition to political elites, many of 
whom had been involved in the conflict that preceded the political settlement, 
religious leaders have also been actively engaged in the establishment and delivery of 
such transitional justice mechanisms. As a number of scholars point out, not only have 
religious personnel played a crucial role in mediating between political elites and the 
mass public in establishing post-conflict peace agreements, they have also been key 
players in the design and delivery of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth 
commissions and the granting of amnesties.14 In fact, at least as far as the South 
Africa is concerned, some scholars go so far as to suggest that the involvement of 
religious leaders in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the inclusion 
of a religious discourse was both a vital and necessary step in facilitating its political 
stability and transition to a sustainable and peaceful democracy.15  
In summary, views on the role of religion and ethnicity in relation to both 
conflict generation and prevention remain highly contested. While some scholars 
point to the over-arching effects of ethnicity, viewing religion as marginal at best, 
others point to the primacy of religion as both a source of conflict and of 
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reconciliation within society.  It is with these competing views in mind that this article 
focuses on the role of religion and ethnonational identity in determining public 
attitudes towards amnesty in Northern Ireland.  The article proceeds in two stages. 
First, it outlines previous research on the role of religion and ethnicity in relation to 
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Secondly, building on this analytical discussion and 
using data from the 2011 Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, it 
examines the impact of religion and ethnonational identity on public attitudes towards 
amnesty. The use of Northern Ireland as a case study may be considered particularly 
appropriate for the following three reasons.  
First, the Northern Ireland peace accord is now considered an exemplar of 
conflict resolution throughout the world. Indeed, since its ratification in 1998, a 
virtual cottage industry has emerged which seeks to export the Northern Ireland 
experience as a model for resolving ethnic and/or religious conflict around the globe. 
Secondly, of the various measures introduced to deal with the legacy of Northern 
Ireland’s violent past the early release of prisoners emerged as one of the most 
unpalatable elements in the Agreement. Although the peace accord did not propose a 
general amnesty,16 the vast majority of people, particularly within the unionist 
community, found this aspect of the Agreement repugnant.17 These deep-seated 
divisions re-emerged when later recommendations such as the suggested one-off 
recognition payment for the nearest relative of those who died,18 or a ‘limited’ 
amnesty for perpetrators involved in Troubles-related deaths19 were proposed. While 
members of the Protestant community reacted in horror to these suggestions, the 
Catholic community was somewhat more accepting in their views, seeing it as a 
necessary, albeit distasteful, price for dealing with the legacy of Northern Ireland’s 
violent past.20 Thirdly, unlike many other Western post-industrial nations, Northern 
Ireland remains a deeply religious society. Currently, 89 per cent of the adult 
population self-identify with a religious affiliation. It is important to note, moreover, 
that this religious identification is more than merely nominal: Northern Ireland has 
traditionally manifested one of the highest levels of religious observance found in 
Europe.21  
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RELIGION, ETHNICITY AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND 
CONFLICT 
Academic opinion remains sharply divided in terms of the role that religion has 
played in the Northern Ireland conflict. On the one hand, there are those who argue 
that religion has not played a significant role in the conflict and is thus irrelevant as a 
solution. As McGarry and O’Leary, one of the main proponents of this position, 
concluded: ‘Explanations that emphasise the primacy of religion…need to be exposed 
to strong light. When that happens, they evaporate, leaving little residue.’22 According 
to this approach the conflict is not religious but rather ethnonationalist in nature and 
thus must be understood primarily as a clash about ethnic identity and contested 
national territory; Unionists who claim a British identity and wish to maintain the link 
with Britain versus Nationalist who claim an Irish identity and want an united Ireland. 
Or, as McGarry and O’Leary, put it when explaining the Northern Ireland conflict: [it] 
is fundamentally rooted in ethno-national antagonism.’23 Thus, from this perspective, 
religion is not the source of the conflict but should be seen simply as an ‘ethnic 
marker’. As such, the terms Protestant and Catholic should be considered nothing 
more than badges of identity that simply distinguish nationalists and unionists; a view 
it should be noted that not only found favour among leaders of the four main churches 
at the onset of the conflict24 but was subsequently widely endorsed by the British and 
Irish government and underpins the Northern Ireland peace accord – Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement – which was ratified in 1998.  
On the other hand, there are a number of commentators who point to the 
crucial role of religion in either generating and/or perpetuating the conflict.25 For 
example, Bruce,26 one of the earlier and leading proponents of this position, has 
emphasised the importance of religion, especially Protestant fundamentalism, in 
informing communal identities and thus both generating and perpetuating sectarian 
divisions within society. As Bruce put it: ‘The Northern Ireland conflict is a religious 
conflict.’27 More recent research provides some further support to this interpretation, 
or the continuing importance of religion in contributing to the conflict via its social 
and political significance. According to this perspective, not only does religion 
continue to be an essential component in the construction of identity within both 
communities – Protestant and Catholic – but it also remains a key factor in 
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constituting as well as maintaining social divisions. As Mitchell, in exemplifying this 
position, argues: ‘Religion plays an important role in constituting social divisions in 
Northern Ireland, rather than simply marking them out… As such, religion is an 
essential part of identification processes in contemporary Northern Ireland and it is at 
least as much about the social as about the spiritual’.28 In fact, some scholars go so far 
as to suggest that since the ratification of the Agreement, religious identity and 
practices have now moved centre stage as the key factor in both maintaining and  
perpetuating sectarian division within this society.29 
More recent research, however, points to the intersection of religion and 
ethnicity in both generating and/or ameliorating communal division and conflict 
within this society. Rejecting either the assumed irrelevance or subordinate position of 
religion, proponents of this perspective suggest that not only is religious identity and 
ethnic identity closely intertwined in Northern Ireland, but both religious identity and 
ethnicity can exert an independent effect on communal division.30 However, as a 
number of scholars have noted, the relative importance attached to each identity – or 
the extent to which ethnicity and religion are ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ – can vary between 
groups as well as across social contexts.31 In other words, the relationship between 
religion and ethnicity is not clear-cut.  While religion can, in some cases, dampen the 
effect of ethnicity and, thereby, assume salience in terms of communal unity or 
division, in other situations, it can help to reinforce and enhance the salience of 
ethnicity by identifying the ‘other’, or those outside the ethnic group. Mitchell’s study 
of the effect of religion and ethnicity on working-class loyalists demonstrates that not 
only can religion be used by individuals for ethnic ends, such as a justification for the 
use of violence in those cases when religion and ethnicity come in conflict, but 
religion can also have a transformative effect or, in this case, overriding opposing 
ethnic lineages in the attempt to forge a unifying community of faith.32 Mitchell, in 
summarising the influence of both religious and ethnicity, writes: ‘Religious ideas 
push and pull against ethnic ideas in the lives of individuals. It is rarely as 
straightforward as one causing the other. The tendency of religion to flux, fuse and 
sometimes jar demonstrates a lack of dominance of one element over the other.’ 33                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
In summary, the role of both religion and ethnonationalism in relation to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland remains a contested and complex issue. While some 
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scholars stress the primacy of ethnonationalism, others point to the crucial role of 
religion as a key mechanism for both generating and resolving conflict within this 
society. Still others, point to the independent effect of both religion and ethnic identity 
on communal cohesion and division within this society. It is with these considerations 
in mind that we now turn to an investigation of the net influence of religion and 
ethnonationalism on attitudes toward amnesty. A key focus of our investigation is to 
assess empirically the degree to which both ethnicity and religion may be considered a 
key determinant of views.  
DATA AND METHODS 
The data used in the analysis are from the 2011 Northern Ireland Social and Political 
Attitudes Survey. Conducted between April and August 2011, the survey is based on a 
multistage random sample and is representative of the adult population. Using a 
questionnaire design, it is based on personal interviews involving 1,500 respondents 
aged 18 years or older, with a response rate of 59 per cent. Given our main focus of 
interest – attitudes towards amnesty both within and between the two main religious 
communities – only individuals who identified themselves explicitly as Protestant or 
Catholic are included in our analysis. This accounts for 1,280 individuals or 85 per 
cent of the total sample and 97 per cent who explicitly claimed a religious affiliation.               
Attitudes towards amnesty, our dependent variable of interest, was operationalised in 
terms of a single item measure, namely levels of support or opposition towards the 
granting of amnesty for those who carried out acts of violence during the conflict. The 
response categories were: strongly support, support, neither support/nor oppose, 
oppose, strongly oppose. 
Religion, our first explanatory variable of interest, is operationalised in terms 
of a range of religious measures, included a variety of religious practices such as 
church membership, attendance and prayer, and indictors of ones belief in and about 
God (see Appendix Table A1).34 Previous, predominantly US-based, survey research 
on the relationship between religion and attitudes towards a range of moral views, 
including attitudes towards capital punishment and the use of more stringent sanctions 
for convicted criminals, suggest that each of these measures has an important, albeit 
divergent, influence on attitudes.35 Of these various religious measures, however, it is 
the rigidity of one’s belief in and perceptions of God, and not religious practices or 
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even biblical literalism, which emerges as the primary determinant of views.36  For 
example, while a range of studies demonstrated that holding a rigid, or a definite, 
belief is God is a significant positive predictor of having a retributive attitude 
regarding criminal punishment and the death penalty,37 others point to the consistently 
negative effect of perceptions of a gracious God in relation to such views.38  
Ethnonationalism, our other primary explanatory variable of interest, was 
operationalised in terms of congruency in religious, national, and communal 
identity.39 As previous research has shown, although national identity and communal 
affiliation significantly overlap in both religious communities in Northern Ireland, 
they are by no means coterminous.40 For example, not all Protestants perceived 
themselves as British and/or adopt a Unionist label. Similarly, not all Catholics view 
themselves as Irish or chose a Nationalist label. In Northern Ireland, religious 
affiliation, national identity and communal affiliation, including territorial 
preferences, were intertwined in a complex way which not only provided the basis for 
the conflict but, until recently, also reinforced its violent and recurrent nature.41 To 
allow for this factor, ethnonationalism is operationalised in terms of congruency – 
Protestants who perceive themselves as both British and Unionist and Catholics who 
are willing to see themselves as both Irish and Nationalist – in ethnonational self-
identification. As in recent survey research, whereas 46 per cent of Protestants were 
willing to choose both identities and regard themselves as British and unionists, 48 
per cent of Catholics were willing to describe themselves as both Irish and 
Nationalist.42 
In addition, we included a number of potentially confounding background 
control variables such as gender, marital status, age, educational attainment and, most 
notably, victimhood status, given its highly contested and problematic nature both in 
Northern Ireland and in other societies emerging from conflict.43 Alternative analysis 
which excluded self-perceptions of victimhood from the investigation demonstrated 
no substantive difference in finding. With the exception of age (coded in terms of 
years) all control variables were included as a series of dummy variables (coded 0 and 
1) in the analyses.  
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use ordinary least squares 
analysis to consider the net effect of religious identity on attitudes towards amnesty. 
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This shows significant differences in relation to this issue between the two religious 
communities. Secondly, we then investigate the net impact of a range of religious 
measures – religious practices, beliefs in and about God – and congruency in 
ethnonational identity on attitudes towards amnesty within the two communities. 
Given the skewed nature of our dependent variable within the two religious 
communities – the majority of which are opposed to amnesty – for the purposes of 
this investigation attitudes towards amnesty has been recoded to the following two 
categories: strongly oppose/oppose (coded 1) and neither support nor 
oppose/oppose/strongly oppose (coded 0), and is based on a logistic regression 
analysis. The figures in each equation are the parameter estimates, while the standard 
errors for each of the estimations are shown in parentheses. Finally, the ‘odds ratio’ 
statistic shows whether the impact of both the control and explanatory variables – 
socio-demographic background and self-perceptions of victimhood, as well as the 
various religion measures and ethnonational identity – increases (score greater than 1) 
or decreases (score less than 1) the likelihood of adopting an oppositional stance in 
relation to amnesty.   
 
RELIGION, ETHNONATIONALISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
AMNESTY 
As a result of over thirty years of conflict, with just under 3,500 dead and over 50,000 
injured, the vast majority of which were members of the civilian population, the 
question of how to come to terms with the legacy of Northern Ireland’s violent past 
remains an extremely contentious and on-going issue.44 This is particularly the case 
when the question of how to deal with ex-combatants are considered. As noted earlier, 
not only was the early release of prisoners considered deeply offensive to the majority 
of individuals but this was particularly the case among Protestants who saw 
themselves as pawns in the inexorable pursuit of peace. In fact, some commentators 
go so far as to suggest that the early release of prisoners as well as ongoing 
revelations concerning the granting of a royal pardon to a number of ex-combatants, 
has become, by far, one of the most the most distasteful and divisive aspects of the 
Northern Ireland peace process.45  
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The data in Table 1 lends some further support to this view. Irrespective of 
whether the Catholic or Protestant population are considered, the vast majority of 
individuals – or just under two-thirds in this instance – remain opposed to the granting 
of amnesty to ex-combatants. For example, whereas around a quarter of individuals 
were strongly opposed to such an initiative, a further two fifths also expressed an 
oppositional view. By contrast, only a minority of individuals, or around a fifth in 
each case, either supported or were undecided in their attitudes. Moreover, the 
strength of support for such an initiative is extremely tepid at best; just three per cent 
strongly supported the granting of amnesty to ex-combatants as compared to 26 per 
cent who were strongly opposed to such an approach. As expected, however, there are 
some marked differences between the two main religious communities in relation to 
this issue, with Catholics being notably less oppositional in their opinion than 
Protestants. While just over half of all Catholics adopted a more retributive or 
negative stance in relation to the granting of amnesty for those who admitted to 
carrying out acts of violence during the conflict, the equivalent proportion among 
Protestants was markedly higher at 77 per cent. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 lends further confirmation to these findings. Even when a range of 
socio-demographic control variables as well as self-perceptions of victimhood are 
included in a regression analysis, religious identity emerges as a strong and 
differential net predictor of attitudes towards amnesty. Catholics are significantly less 
likely to adopt an oppositional stance in relation to this issue than Protestants. This is 
not to suggest, however, that religious identity is the sole determinant of attitudes in 
this instance. Other noteworthy predictors, net of other factors, include the positive 
effect of gender (women being more likely to oppose such an initiative than men) and 
the negative effect of victimhood status (victims were significantly less likely to adopt 
an oppositional stance in relation to amnesty than non-victims).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
To what extent, however, does the influence of religion endure when the 
impact both of a range of religious measures as well as ethnonational identity is 
investigated separately within the two main religious communities?  Moreover, as 
 11 
    
suggested earlier, of the various religious measures, is it one’s belief in and about 
God, which is the primary factor in accounting for views? Table 3 investigates this 
question by focusing on the net impact of a range of religious measures (such as 
participation and beliefs in and about God) and ethnonational identity on attitudes 
towards amnesty within both the Catholic and Protestant communities. The results are 
clear. Irrespective of whether Catholics or Protestants are considered, both religion 
and ethnonational identity are key distinguishing predictors of opinions concerning 
amnesty. Of the various religious measures, however, it is one’s beliefs in or about 
God and not religious practices that are the most consistent determinants of views.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
Focusing initially on the Catholic population, the results in Table 3 are clear. 
Both religion and ethnonationalism are significant net predictors of attitudes towards 
amnesty. Of the various religious measures, however, it is one’s beliefs in and about 
God, and not religious practices, which emerge as the key distinguishing determinants 
of attitudes in this instance. More specifically, it is a definite belief in God, 
perceptions of an engaged God and biblical literalism which are primary predictors of 
views. For example, individuals who definitely believe in God and who believe that 
the Bible is the literal word of God are almost twice as likely – the odds ratio are 1.91 
and 1.85, respectively – net of all other factors, to adopt an oppositional stance in 
relation to amnesty than those who do not.  
A similar, albeit converse, pattern emerges when perceptions concerning 
God’s level of engagement with the world are considered. Catholics who believed in 
an engaged God were significantly less likely to support this position than those who 
did not. Or to put it in a positive direction for ease of interpretation: Catholics who did 
not believe in an engaged God were 1.89 times more likely (the inverse of exp(B) or 
1/0.53) to be opposed to amnesty than those who did. Finally, when congruency in 
identity is considered the direction of effect is again negative. Catholics who were 
congruent in terms of their identity (that is, who perceived themselves as both Irish 
and Nationalist) were also significantly less likely, net of all other factors, to adopt an 
oppositional stance in relation to amnesty than those who were not.46 Thus, at least as 
far as the relationship between religion and ethnonational identity on attitudes towards 
amnesty among the Catholic population is considered, it is individuals who believe in 
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an engaged God and are congruent in their identity who stand out as the most 
consistent and the least oppositional in their views.   
This is not to suggest that these religious measures or the impact of 
congruency in ethnonational identity are the sole predictors of attitudes in this 
instance. Of the socio-demographic control variables, both gender and age were also a 
significant positive determinant of views. While females were almost twice as likely 
as males to oppose amnesty, older individuals were also notably more likely to do so 
than their younger counterparts. By contrast, unlike our previous analysis, self-
perceptions of victimhood failed to emerge as a significant determinant of attitudes in 
this instance, a not unexpected finding given the suggested dominance of both religion 
and ethnonationalism as the primary source and motivator of communal division and 
conflict within this society.47  
These patterns are partially replicated when the opinions of Protestants are 
considered. Again, both religion and ethnonationalism are significant net predictors of 
attitudes towards amnesty within the Protestant community. Of the various religious 
measures, however, it is both biblical literalism and a belief in an engaged God which 
emerge as the key distinguishing determinants of views. As in our previous analysis,  
while Protestants who believed that the Bible was the literal word of God were 
significantly more likely to endorse an oppositional stance in relation to amnesty, 
individuals who believed in an engaged God were notably less likely to do so. Again, 
religious practices – and, in this instance, also denominational differences – failed to 
emerge as a significant predictor of views. Contrary to our previous analysis, 
however, congruency in ethnonational identity in this instance has a significant 
positive effect on attitudes. Protestants who viewed themselves as both British and 
Unionist were over four times more likely – the odds ratio is 4.52 – to oppose amnesty 
than those who did not.  Thus, at least as far as the Protestant population is 
considered, it is individuals who either believe that the Bible is the literal word of God 
or express traditional notions of identity (British-Unionist) who stand out as the most 
uniform but oppositional in their views.   
What may explain the differing direction of effects of ethnonationalism 
between the two religious communities? Part of explanation we suggest may rest with 
the contested nature both of victimhood and combatant status within this society. As 
 13 
    
noted earlier, the question of how to come to terms with the legacy of Northern 
Ireland’s violent past remains an extremely contentious and on-going concern. This is 
particularly the case when the issue of how to deal with ex-combatants are considered. 
For example, not only was the early release of prisoners – both Republican as well as 
Loyalist – considered deeply offensive to the majority of individuals but this was 
particularly so in the Protestant community who saw themselves as ‘innocent victims’ 
sacrificed to appease the demands of ‘convicted terrorists’. In fact, more so than any 
other factor, it is this assumed moral equivalence in status between perpetrators of 
‘terrorist’ activity and their ‘innocent’ victims which lies at the heart of Protestant 
disillusionment with the Northern Ireland peace process and has stymied the 
introduction of a range of initiatives – such as a truth and reconciliation commission – 
to deal with the legacy of its violent past.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, studies of ethnicity, ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict have paid 
scant attention to religion, viewing it as either superfluous or marginal at best. 
Pointing instead to the primary impact of a range of other influences, such as 
economic deprivation and greed or the political organisations of minority groups and 
their desire for self-determination, proponents of this perspective highlight the role of 
economic and/or political factors as the primary determinant of ethnically-based 
conflict and intra-state violence. Research over the last few decades, however, calls 
into question this view. Stressing instead the emergence of religion as a global 
political force, advocates of this position point to the role of religion as the primary 
source of conflict based on ethnonationalist disputes. In fact, some scholars go so far 
as to suggest that such religiously-based conflicts have now become the most 
pervasive form of conflict and the most common justification for terrorism in the 
world today.   
More recent research, however, rejects the singularity of both these 
approaches. Focusing instead on the combined impact of both religion and ethnicity 
on conflict, proponents of this perspective argue that not only are religion and 
ethnicity deeply intertwined, but a key factor in accounting for intra-state conflicts 
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based on ethnic differences is both their religious and ethnic dimensions.  In other 
words, it is the intersection and combination of these two factors – both religion and 
national identity – which are the two most dominant features in predicting the onset of 
ethnonational disputes, or conflicts based on ethnic differences, in the post-Cold War 
era. And, while both religion and ethnonationalism are considered to have an 
independent net effect on such intra-state conflicts, the degree to which either religion 
or ethnnonationalist aspirations is the primary motivator of conflict remains open to 
some dispute. While some analysts point to the dominance of ethnonationalism, others 
highlight the religious dimension.  
The results of our investigation lend some further support to this dualistic view 
– namely the influence of both religion and ethnonationalism as a key determinant in 
explaining attitudes towards amnesty. Our arguments in support of this proposition 
are threefold. First, religious identification is a key distinguishing predictor of 
opinions concerning amnesty. Even when a range of background control variables are 
included in the analysis, Protestants are significantly more oppositional in their views 
than Catholics. Secondly, when the impact of both religion and ethnonationalism 
within the two communities is considered separately, both religion and 
ethnonationalism are significant net predictors of attitudes. Of these various religious 
measures, however, it is one’s belief in and about God which emerges as the key 
distinguisher of views. As in previous research on attitudes towards a range of moral 
attitudes, including the death penalty,48 while both religious rigidity, or holding a 
definite belief is God, and a view that the Bible is the literal word of God, are 
significant positive predictors of expressing a retributive, or oppositional stance, 
regarding amnesty, perceptions of an engaged God is a significant negative predictor 
of such views. Thirdly, a similar pattern emerges when the influence of 
ethnonationalism is considered. While ethnonationalism, or congruency in religious, 
national and communal identity, is a significant positive determinant of opposition 
towards amnesty among Protestants, it is has a significant negative effect on such 
views within the Catholic community. Finally, it is important to note, the relationship 
between religion and ethnonationalism on attitudes towards amnesty also differs 
between the two communities. While perceptions of an engaged God and 
ethnonationalism are the most consistent negative determinants of opinion with regard 
to opposition to amnesty among Catholics, it is a belief in the Bible as the literal word 
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of God and ethnonational identity which emerge as the most uniform positive 
predictors of such retributive views within the Protestant community. 
Overall, our results point to the important role of both religion and 
ethnonational identity in determining attitudes toward transitional justice mechanisms 
in societies emerging from conflict. It is to a further investigation of this issue – the 
complex and differential impact of both religion and national identity – on attitudes 
towards a variety of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, that 
future research should be directed. Where possible a range of other religious and 
ethnic measures, such as religious saliency and strength of ethnic conviction, should 
also be included in the analysis. Only via such an examination, can the complex and 
net impact of both religion and ethnonational identity on ethnic conflict – including 
how to deal with the legacy of its violent past – be comprehensively investigated and 
understood. 
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Table 1: Religious Identity and Attitudes Towards Amnesty 
 
 (Percentages) 
 Catholic Protestant All 
  
Strong Support 4.0 1.3 2.6 
Support 23.7 7.4 15.1 
Neither Support nor Oppose 20.3 14.4 17.2 
Oppose 37.0 41.5 39.3 
Strongly Oppose 15.0 35.5 25.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(N) (552) (612) (1,164) 
 
Question: Could you tell me how you feel about the following issues: ‘An amnesty for those 
who admit to carrying out acts of violence during the troubles.’ 
 
Source: Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
    
Table 2: The Net Effect of Religious Identity on Attitudes Towards Amnesty 
 
 Regression Coefficients (OLS) 
 b Beta 
Socio-Demographic Background:   
Female  .05** .10 
Married              -.01 -.01 
Age (years)               .01 .04 
Education:   
  Tertiarya --- --- 
  Secondary               .01 .01 
  No qualification               .01 .02 
Victimhood status (victim)             -.04* -.06 
   
Religious Identity:   
Catholic -.17** -.31 
   
Constant  .702**  
R-squared              .110  
(N) (1,164)  
 
Notes: Attitudes towards amnesty are coded from 0 (most supportive) to 1 (most opposed); *, 
significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a, missing category of 
comparison.  
 
Source: Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, 2011 
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Table 3: The Net Effect of Religion and Ethnonationalism on Opposition 
Towards Amnesty Among Catholics and Protestants 
 (Logistic Regression Coefficients) 
 Catholics  Protestants 
  
Estimate 
 
(SE)  
Odds 
Ratio 
 
Estimate 
 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Socio-Demographic Background:      
Female     0.67** (0.21) 1.95     0.28 (0.23) 1.33 
Married    -0.09 (0.21)    0.92     0.42 (0.24)    1.55 
Age (years)     0.02* (0.01) 1.02    -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 
Education:       
  Tertiarya       ---    ---    ---       ---    ---    --- 
  Secondary   -0.28 (0.29) 0.76   -0.13 (0.33) 0.88 
  No qualification   -0.53 (0.36) 0.59    0.27 (0.42) 1.31 
Victimhood status (victim)   -0.43 (0.22) 0.65   -0.31 (0.26) 0.73 
       
Religious Measures:       
Denomination       
  Presbyteriana --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  Anglican --- --- ---    -0.25 (0.27) 0.78 
  Other Protestant --- --- ---    -0.49 (0.29) 0.61 
       
Religious Practices       
Church attendance (monthly)     0.42 (0.34) 1.52    -0.45 (0.37) 0.64 
Pray (weekly)    -0.22 (0.25) 0.80    -0.14 (0.30) 0.87 
       
Beliefs In/About God       
Believe (definitely)    0.65** (0.23) 1.91    0.24 (0.30) 1.28 
Engaged God   -0.63* (0.25) 0.53   -0.67* (0.30) 0.51 
Bible (Literal word of God)       0.61* (0.28) 1.85    0.67* (0.29) 1.96 
      
Ethnonationalism:       
Irish-Nationalist/British-
Unionist 
  -0.46* (0.20) 0.64   1.51** (0.26) 4.52 
      
Constant -0.936*    1.595**  
Nagelkerke R-square    .140      .191  
(N)    (481)      (543)  
 
Notes: Attitudes towards amnesty are coded 1 (opposed) and 0 (other); Standard errors (SE) 
are in parentheses; *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a, missing 
category of comparison.  
 
Source: Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, 2011 
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Table A1: Measures 
 
Variable Question Response Categories 
Attitudes Towards 
Amnesty 
Could you tell me how you feel 
about the following issues: An 
amnesty for those who admit to 
carrying out acts of violence 
during the troubles 
Strongly support; support; neither support 
nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose.  
Religious Identity and Practices   
Identity Do you regard yourself as 
belonging to any particular 
religion? If yes, which? 
 
Church attendance Apart from special occasions 
such as weddings, funerals, 
baptisms and so on, how often 
nowadays do you attend services 
or meetings connected with your 
religion? 
8 point scale ranging from 1 for never to 8 
for several times a  week 
Pray About how often do you pray? 11 point scale ranging from 1 for never to 
11 for several times a  day 
 One’s Beliefs In and About God:  
Belief in God  Which statement comes closest 
to expressing what you believe 
about God? 
I don’t believe in God; I don’t know 
whether there is a God and I don’t believe 
that there is a way to find out; I don’t 
believe in a personal God, but I do believe 
in a Higher Power of some kind; I find 
myself believing in God some of the time, 
but not at others; While I have doubts, I do 
feel that I do believe in God; I know God 
really exists and I have no doubts about it 
Engaged God There is a God who concerns 
Himself with every human being 
personally  
Strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor 
disagree; disagree; strongly disagree. 
Biblical literalism Which of these statements 
comes closest to describing your 
feelings about the Bible? 
The Bible is the actual word of God and is 
to be taken literally, word for word; The 
Bible is the inspired word of God but not 
everything should be taken literally, word 
for word; The Bible is an ancient book of 
fables, legends, history and moral precepts 
recorded by humankind; This does not 
apply to me. 
Ethnonationalism:   
National Identity Which of these best describes 
the way you usually think of 
yourself? 
British, Irish, Ulster, Northern Irish, Other. 
Communal Identity Generally speaking, do you 
think of yourself as a unionist, a 
nationalist, or neither 
Unionist, Nationalist, Neither 
Source: Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, 2011 
 
